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Abrams v. Sanson, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 9 (Mar. 5, 2020)1
TORT LAW: DEFAMATION, INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS,
NEGLIGENT INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS, FALSE LIGHT, BUSINESS
DISPARAGEMENT, CIVIL CONSPIRACY, CONCERT OF ACTION
Summary
The Court determined that statements sent to an email listserv criticizing an attorney’s
courtroom conduct were good faith communications regarding a matter of public concern and
were protected under the Nevada anti-SLAPP statutes. However, the Court held that Abrams did
not show a probability of prevailing on her claims with prima facie evidence as her claims did
not exhibit minimal merit.
Background
Jennifer Abrams was working as an attorney. Abrams’ opposing counsel, Louis Schneider,
allegedly provided a video of Abrams to Steve Sanson, president of Veterans in Politics
International, Inc. (VIPI). Sanson published five articles criticizing Abrams on the VIPI website.
The articles were also distributed to VIPI’s email listserv. Additionally, Sanson allegedly made
disparaging comments regarding Abrams on a telephone call with an employee of Abrams’ law
firm.
Abrams filed a complaint against Sanson and Schneider alleging multiple tort claims. Sanson
and Schneider filed special motions to dismiss under the Nevada anti-SLAPP statutes. The
district court granted Sanson’s motion, finding that the statements about Abrams’ job
performance as an attorney were a matter of public concern made in good faith and that
providing the statements to an email listerv constituted communication in a public forum. The
district court further found that Abrams did not show a probability of prevailing on her claims
with prima facie evidence. Schneider’s motion was also granted by the district court, as he had
not directly made any of the statements. Abrams appealed.
Discussion
Statements about an attorney’s courtroom conduct and practice of sealing cases directly connect
to an issue of public interest
Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes provide that a good faith communication regarding a matter of
public concern includes any communication “made in direct connection with an issue of public
interest in a place open to the public or in a public forum which is truthful or is made without
knowledge of its falsehood.”2 The Court previously adopted five guiding principles including
that “public interest does not equate with mere curiosity”, “public interest should be something
of concern to a substantial number of people”, “there should be some degree of closeness
between the challenged statements and the asserted public interest”, “the focus of the speaker’s
conduct should be the public interest” and “a person cannot turn otherwise private information
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NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.637(4).

into a matter of public interest simply by communicating it to a large number of people” to use in
determining whether an issue is of public interest.3
Applying the guiding principles, the Court held that Sanson’s statements directly connected to
an issue of public interest. Since Abrams’ courtroom conduct could impact her current and future
clients, it is an issue that rises above mere curiosity. Additionally, Abrams’ public actions in
court concern the public’s interest and impact more than just a small audience. Finally, since the
statements involved courtroom behavior and Abrams’ practice of moving to seal cases, the Court
held that these were public conduct issues and not private controversy.
An email listerv may constitute a public forum
In order for statements to be protected under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes, they must be
communicated “in a place open to the public or in a public forum.”4 Here, the statements were
sent to approximately 50,000 people who subscribed to the VIPI email listserv. This is
distinguishable from a single email exchange between two parties and is akin to a television
broadcast. Although the emails were received in private email inboxes, they were still considered
to be in a public forum for purposes of the anti-SLAPP statutes, particularly because the
statements were also posted on public websites.
A private telephone conversation does not constitute a public forum
To fall within the scope of Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes, the statements must be made “in a
place open to the public or in a public forum.”5 Since a telephone conversation is private by its
nature, a telephone conversation is not protected under the anti-SLAPP statutes and Sanson’s
statements during the telephone call were not included further in the Court’s analysis.
Sanson’s statements were either truthful or statements of opinion incapable of being false
To receive protection under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes, a statement must be a “good faith
communication” which is “truthful or is made without knowledge of its falsehood.”6 Some of the
statements made about Abrams were based on video recordings of actual court proceedings and
as such are truthful portrayals of Abrams. The majority of the statements at issue were Sanson’s
opinions criticizing Abrams and as such cannot be knowingly false.
Abrams did not prove with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on her claims
After it was determined that Sanson met his burden under the first prong of the Nevada antiSLAPP statute, the burden shifted to Abrams to determine if she met her burden under the
second prong. The plaintiff’s burden for prong two in Nevada is the same as it is in California’s
anti-SLAPP statute, whether the claims have “minimal merit.”7
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Each of Abrams’ tort claims was evaluated independently and the Court concluded that
minimal merit was not established. The defamation claim included opinions which could not be
defamatory. The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim did not show extreme and
outrageous conduct. Since no negligence was demonstrated, the claim for negligent infliction of
emotional distress did not show minimal merit. The false light claim failed to show that Abrams
was portrayed in a false light. The business disparagement claim did not show economic loss.
The civil conspiracy claim did not show an intent to commit an unlawful objective. The concert
of action claim did not show any tortious action. Due to these findings, the court held that
Abrams failed to meet her burden under the second prong.
Conclusion
Since Sanson’s statements were truthful or personal opinions, concerned matters of public
interest and were communicated on an email listerv which can be considered a public forum, the
Court held that the district court correctly found that first prong of the Nevada anti-SLAPP
statutes were satisfied and the statements were protected. The Court further held that the district
court correctly found that Abrams’ claims did not show minimal merit and therefore she did not
satisfy her burden under the second prong. However, the Court held that the district court erred
in including the telephone statements under the anti-SLAPP statutes as a telephone conversation
is not a public forum. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further
proceedings.

